In the Matter of the Estate of Fred W. Harper : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
In the Matter of the Estate of Fred W. Harper : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinne
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Harper, No. 8049 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2066
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ESTATE 
OF Case No. 8049 
FRED W. HARPER, Deceased. 
BRIEF OF RES·PONDENT 
FRED L. FINLINSON, 
Attorney for Respondent 
312 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
S TATE~IENT __ --------------------------------------- ______ __________ ___________ 1 
ARG lT~IENT __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _____________ ____ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ ___ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___ 4 
CON CL USI 0 N ------------------------------- _______ ____ ________ ____ ___ ______ _____ 9 
CASES CITED 
In re Johnson Estate (1934) 84 Utah 168, 
35 P. 2d., 305 __________________________________________________________________ 4, 5 
Morris v. Propst, 55 P. 2d., 944------------------------------------------ 7 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission (1.933) 
82 Utah 179, 22 P. 2d., 1046 ____________________________________ 4, 5, 6 
Spencer v. Clark ( 1919), 54 Utah 83, 1.79 P. 7 41 ____________ 4, 5 
TEXTS. CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 40-3-6 and 7------------------------3, 6 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 104-59-1 ________________________________ 1, 7 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 30-3-6 and 7------------------------3, 6 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 78-41-1 ________________________________ 1, 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE 11.:\_TTER OF 
THE EST.A.TE 
OF 
FRED W. H.J..t\.RPER, Deceased. 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 8049 
Respondent, Zilpha D. Harper, defends the judgment 
of the Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, made and entered in the above entitled matter 
and from which appellant appeals. In the court below 
respondent initiated by petition an independent proceed-
ing to terminate a joint tenancy under the provisions 
of Title 104-9-1, UCA 1943, now know as 78-41-1, UCA 
1953. (R .. 1-3) Appellant answered the petition for termi-
nation of the joint tenancy by denying her allegations 
and alleging that the property was the sole and separate 
property of the estate of Fred W. Harper, deceased, 
by reason of a judicial decree adjudicating and awarding 
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it to hi111 (R. 8) and that as to the disposition of the 
propPr·ty rightH said decree was final. "rhe matter was 
:--;u\unittt~d to the <·ourt uvon the facts as stipulated to 
hPt \\'PPn tlu_· partie~. (Said stipulation was not included 
by the appPllant in the Designation of Record on Appeal, 
ln1t tlt<> ftu·t ~ as stipulated were found by the court. 
~t>t• l~'indin~s of I~' act, R. 10-12.) l)erhaps a brief state-
llt<>nt of the f:u·ts as respondent understands them would 
l~t· }u•l pful to tlH~ c·ourt: 
n .. ~JHHtdent and Fred \V. llarper, now deceased, 
\\'Pl't· ntarriPd at Salt Lake City, 1~tah, on June 20, 1927. 
During their 1L1arriage they acquired through their 
joint efforts the }Jroperty in question as joint tenants 
"·ith full right of survivorship and not as tenants i~ 
eouuuon, bv a deed of conveyance fron1 Isabella ~{. 
o I 
.K orton and Leslie J. N" or ton dated May 9, 1931. On 
Dece1nber 15, 1949, Fred W. Harper filed in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County a complaint asking for a 
divorce from the respondent. The case was given the 
nu1nber 87,837. On December 24, 1949, respondent'~ 
appearance and waiver, dated December 16, 1949, was 
filed in said action, and the matter heard. The court 
granted Fred ''-,-· Harper a divorce and awarded him 
the property in question. Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and an Interlocutory Decree were signed by 
the Judge and entered on the same day, to-wit, December 
24, 1949. (R. 20-26) (The entire divorce file, including 
respondent's motion to set aside and dismiss the action 
and the court's order granting said motion is a part of 
the record on appeal. R. 20-28) The divorce was granted 
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on the grounds of desertion. The interlocutory decree of 
div-orce, 'Ya.s by its tern1s and pursuit to provisions of 
40-3-6 & "7 U.C.A. 1943, 30-3-6 & 7 U.C.A. 1953, not to be-
come final until the expiration of six n1onths from the 
date thereof, and that it 'vas to becon1e final after si.x 
months from date thereof unless proceedings for a 
review 'vere pending or the court, upon its own motion 
or upon the motion of any other person, should order-
wise order. (R. 25-26) On June. 7, 1950, Fred W. 
Harper died at Salt Lake City, Utah, (R. 11) and left 
surviving him in addition to respondent, Anna Lenoch, 
his Mother and Omar L. Harper of Oakland, California, 
a son by a prior marriage, (R. 3) and on June 12, 1950, 
and before the expiration of the interlocutory period, 
the court, upon the petition of the respondent, duly 
entered its order vacating and setting aside said inter-
locutory decree of divorce and dismissed the plaintiff's 
complaint on file therein. Respondent's petition was 
heard ex parte· and 'vithout notice of any kind to the 
appellant or any other person. The order vacating and 
setting aside the interlocutory decree of divorce and 
dismissing the complaint has not been appealed from or 
otherwise modified. The trial court on said facts as 
stipulated granted respondent's petition to terminate 
the joint tenancy, and held that the estate of Fred W. 
Harper, now deceased, had no interest in the property. 
(R. 13-14) From that judgment this appeal was taken 
by appellant. 
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ARGUMENT 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
tllP following particulars: 
1. Th<· trial ('Ourt should have held that the death 
of a ~pousP during the interlocutory period does not set 
the prOJH·rty iut<~n~~ts in the interlocutory decree at 
laq.~P. 
2. 'l'l1(• trial court should have held that these prop-
t·rty iutPrel't ~ were (h•feasible, if at all, only by giving 
not i<·P and opportunity to be heard to the heirs and 
adtnini~t ra tors of tlH:· e~tate of the deceased spouse. 
3. The trial court should have held that the sur-
,·iyin.~ S}Juuse had no interest in the property of the 
uL~eea~ed spou~e because a division of property had 
lH_~·en effected. 
See Appellant's Brief, page 5. 
Respondent subnuts that the questions (alleged 
errors of the trial court) have been decided by this 
court and against the appellant in the following cases: 
Spencer Y. Clark, ( 1919) 54 Utah 83, 179 P. 
741; 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Con11nission, 
(1933) 82 Utah 179, 22 P. 2d., 1046; 
In re Johnson's Estate, (1934) 83 Utah 168, 
35 p. 2d., 305. 
In the Spencer case there had been an interlocutory 
decree of divorce granted to the plaintiff (the wife) 
and an award to her of certain real property. The 
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plaintiff (the wife) died before the interlocutory decree 
beca1ne final, and the court thereafter vacated the 
divorce proceeding on an affidavit and n1otion of the 
defendant. In a fight over the real property between the 
defendant (husband) and the administrator of the estate 
of the plaintiff (wife), this court only concerned itself 
'vith the question of whether the interlocutory decree 
had been vacated before it became final, and having 
found that to have been the fact, treated the same as 
a nullity. In other words, this court in that case held 
that the interlocutory decree awarding the real property 
to the deceased spouse having vacated, nullified and 
set at naught, did not in any wise affect the property 
therein awarded to the plaintiff (wife). Both the 
Spencer case, supra, and In re Johnson's Estate case, 
supra, settled the question raised by appellant's error 
No. 2, and unequivocally held that, during the inter-
locutory period and after the death of one of the 
parties to the divorce action, the court in the divorce 
action, without notice, on motion or petition of surviving 
spouse, may vacate the interlocutory decree and dismiss 
the divorce action. In the Spencer case bear in mind 
that title to the real property was awarded to the plain-
tiff in the divorce action and this court did not concern 
itself with the effect, if any, of the interlocutory decree 
upon the property interests. 
In the Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission case, 
supra, the court even went further and held that the 
court, on its own motion and without notice and without 
application by anyone and on facts within its own 
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knowlPuge, eould order that the interlocutory decree 
H Hhall not become final" until a date long after the 
original ~;ix months' interlocutory period had expired. 
l~utler our statute, 40-:~-7, UCA 1943, now 30-3-7, UCA 
1~);>:~. thP (•ourt may vacate an interlocutory decree ex 
part(· aud on it~ own ruotion. 1 Ience, it is submitted that 
app•·lla11t (·annot co1nplain that the order vacating the 
int•·rl(wutory dP<·ree here was a nullity because made 
(\'( partP aud without notice to the heirs and personal 
rt~pr~·:--: .. utati\·(·~: of l~,red W. Ilarper. Furthermore, if 
app(~llant (·ould eoinplain, he cannot attack such order 
vacating the interlocutory decree in this independent 
action brought by the re:-:pondent, since such an attack 
would be a collateral attack and not permissible. This 
court so held in the 5'alt Lake City v. Industrial Commis-
sion case, supra, when the court, speaking through Jus-
tice Folland, said : 
"A judg~nent or decree of divorce, not void 
on its face, 1nay not be impeached collaterally. 
Corbett v. Corbett, 113 Cal. App. 595, 298 P. 819. 
The same must be true as to an order or judgment 
of dismissal or annulment of a divorce decree. 
The burden to establish invalidity is on the party 
making a collateral attack, and every presurnption 
will be indulged in support of the order. 34 C.J. 
537; 19 C.J. 175; 1 Black on Judgment, Sec. 270." 
Appellant cites some authorities tending to sho'v 
that marital rights may be changed by order vacating 
an interlocutory decree, but not property rights. Such 
authorities generally apply to situations where the par-
ties entered into formal agreements where specific per-
formance might be resorted to for enforcement. As in 
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the Colorado case ltlorr·is v. Propst, 55 P .. (2d) 944 . 
. A.ppellant atten1pts to attribute an interpretation of dicta 
in In re Johnson's estate ,supra, as reflective of this 
court's attitude in the n1atter if the point were ever 
raised. Sufficeth to say, this point has been raised 
and settled in the Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm.is-
sion case, supra, since the Commission's award to the 
wife zcas an a.u·a.rd of a property arising out of injuries 
sustained by the husband, and appellant, if logical, would 
have to contend that such an award would go to Harper's 
estate since the interlocutory decree definitely and 
pern1anently settled property rights of the parties for 
all time. The fact of the matter is that this valuable 
property right, which would have given the husband 
continuing disability benefits had he lived and would 
have been paid to him personally, has been affirmed in 
the wife by said decision. The Spencer case is even 
stronger, since in that case real property was awarded 
to the wife in the interlocutory decree. In the case at 
bar respondent contends under the facts and the la-\v 
as follows: 
1. That the interlocutory decree of divorce between 
respondent and Fred W. Harper had not become final 
on June 7, 1950, the date of the death of Fred W. Harper. 
2. That by its own terms and under the statute, 
104-59-1, UCA 1943, now known as 78-41-1, DCA 1953, it 
would not become final until six months had expired 
from the date of its entry. 
3. That on June 12, 1950, after the death of the 
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spouse, Fred W. Harper, and before the interlocutory 
pt~riod had t>xpired, the court on the petition of an inter-
P~tPd party, to-wit, Zilpha D. Harper, the surviving 
~pou~v, t>Htt·rt>d its order setting aside the interlocutory 
(lecr(·e of (livorce and di~missed the complaint of the 
planitiff, l•,red W. 1-Iarper. 
·L 'l'ha t th(• order s~tting aside the interlocutory 
<lt•(·n·(· of divon·e is not only fair on its face, but is 
,·ulid in eYf~ry re~pect, and that respondent's motion to 
~t>t a~idt_. the saluP and the ex parte hearing thereon 
\rithout noti(·e \\'a~ proper and lawful. 
;). That the order setting aside the interlocutory 
dt>('rtje and dis1nissing plaintiff's complaint was not 
appealed fron1 or other"Tise n1odified, and that the same 
i8 not subject to a collateral attack in this proceeding. 
(i. That said order setting aside the interlocutory 
deeree and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint nullified 
and set at naught not only the interlocutory decree sever-
ing the bonds of rna trin1ony, but also in every other 
particular, including a 'varding the property to Fred 
W. Harper. 
7. That the interlocutory decree of divorce having 
been set aside, vacated and nullified, the title (joint 
tenancy) to the real property was not affected thereby 
and that the joint tenant, Fred W. Harper, having died, 
title to the same vested in the surviving joint tenant, 
the respondent. 
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CONCLlTSION 
In conclu~ion, respondent subn1its that the case at 
bar is rontrolled by the decisions of this court in the 
three cases above cited, that the order vacating the 
interlocutory decree of_ divorce is valid in every respect 
and had the effect of nullifying and setting at naught 
said interlocutory decr~e, with the result that the title 
to the property in question was not affected in any way 
thereby. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED L. FINLINSON, 
Attorney for Respondent 
312 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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Received two copies of the foregoing Brief· this 
. ----------·----~~-~-day of October, 1953. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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